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Abstract: Spain and many European countries are going through a critical stage that endangers the 
achievements of civilization and protection of social rights which are the standard of the constitutionalism 
of the social-democratic systems after the Second World War. The emergence of the economic and 
financial crisis and its impact on Member States, especially in regard to the realization of the rights and, 
in particular, the social ones, impose a critical reflection since on the European scene there is not a shared 
concept. In the Spanish social and democratic rule of law, many of the social rights are placed in Chapter 
III of Title I as guiding principles of social and economic policy. The analysis of this regulatory body of 
the Constitution is problematic insofar as it raises the problem of redirecting the content of such rules to 
legal structures in order to ensure guarantee levels which approximate them to fundamental rights within 
the framework of a European model of social democracy. The problem of the welfare state (in Spain and 
other European countries) affects the quality of representative democracy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
With the affirmation of the democratic principle, the European constitutional 
doctrine of the second post-war era, accepting the full legislative nature of constitutions, 
has highlighted a new state model –social and democratic rule of law- based on 
universal suffrage and on the participation of citizens in the formation of the will of the 
state and, moreover, on the constitutional guarantee of the effectiveness of fundamental 
rights. Beside the original principle of formal equality, the social principle of substantial 
equality, the consolidation of the tasks of the state and the constitutional provision of 
new and more extensive catalogs of rights (political, civil, economic, and social) are 
stated. 
1 Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Calabria, Italy (fernando.puzzo@unical.it). 
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Although with different formulas for intensity and latitude for the recognition 
and for the protection of specific legal situations, it can be said that in the European 
constitutionalism of the second postwar era a close relationship between advanced 
conception of democracy, form of state and fundamental rights has been positivized. 
Very differently from how it was sanctioned in the original liberal constitutionalism, 
such a relationship is done through the expansion of constitutionally protected legal 
situations and a new interpretation of the concept of freedom, now tightly integrated 
with that of equality: a concept of equality which considers as unacceptable the 
differences based on economic and social relationship, i.e. those based on income 
capacity. Finally, in such a view the social rights, along with the classical ones of 
freedom, are conceived as constitutive conditions of the constitutional principle of 
equality and, at the same time, of the value of the person and their dignity. 
 
However, in the European countries it is not always possible to perceive a 
positivization of the fundamental social rights as legal situations constitutionally 
recognized and protected in ways comparable with the so-called negative liberties2. 
Indeed, while civil and political rights are recognized as a common basis of modern 
democratic states in all European constitutions, only from the constitutionalism after the 
second post-war era on, with the evolution of contemporary form of state, new 
fundamental rights, based on the close integration between the notion of freedom and of 
equality, are stated and as a consequence the social rights appeared. From that 
perspective, the principles of social justice that inspire contemporary constitutions, by 
incorporating the "freedom from want"3, implement the right to demand the services 
aimed at ensuring the individual and the citizen a minimum of security and social 
justice . 
 
Referring to their protection, in the constitutional state of the second world 
postwar, the rights exist by the constitution, which expresses, as known, something 
more and different from the law of the liberal state, because in the fullness of its 
provisions it represents "an essential transformation"4 in respect of the previous liberal-
democratic constitutions. 
 
In this perspective, where the ius is no longer lex and the rights are no longer a 
rule set by the legislature, the constitutions establish subjective claims binding the state 
in the concrete exercise of its power. The contemporary constitutionalism makes a 
metamorphosis of the sovereignty of the law into the sovereignty of the constitution, 
thus transforming the fundamental rights into inviolable rights5. 
 
2 Cfr. A. Saccomanno, “Eguaglianza sostanziale e diritti sociali nel rapporto fra ordinamento interno ed 
ordinamento comunitario” in S. Gambino  (Coord.), Costituzione e diritto comunitario. Principi e 
tradizioni costituzionali comuni. La formazione giurisprudenziale del diritto costituzionale europeo, 
Milano, 2002.   
3 Cfr. N. Bobbio, “Sui diritti sociali”, in G. Neppi Modona (a cura di), Cinquant’anni di Repubblica 
italiana, Torino, 1996. 
4 Cfr. F. Balaguer Callejón, (coord.), Manual de Derecho constitucional, 2008. 
5 Cfr. G. Zagrebelsky, Il diritto mite, Torino, 1992. 
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On this basis the "welfare state" is born, which by sanctioning the primacy of 
politics over economics in the framework of a model of emancipatory substantial 
democracy, maneuvers the levers of the economic system and becomes promoter of 
development, pull factor for production and employment according to the standards of a 
Keynesian economic interventionism that allows bridle the capitalism in the network of 
the democracy. 
 
However, it is still possible to perceive the absence of a shared concept on the 
effectiveness of the rights -particularly the social ones, since many constitutional 
provisions are different either because of their legal qualification or because of the legal 
scope of such rights. 
 
Indeed, some European systems, for example, discipline this matter through 
general clauses (art. 20 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany)  or  through 
"Guiding Principles of Social and Economic Policy" (Chap. III EC ), while others -as 
the Italian Constitution- protect the social rights either through fundamental principles 
or with specific constitutional provisions. 
 
Although the Spanish constitutional catalog of social rights is extended and has 
the nature of constitutional rights, the doctrine stresses that the jurisdictional forms of 
their protection are not always the appropriate for subjective rights, as they are closer to 
those of the "legitimate interests", since between their prevision and their a legislative  
and administrative “facere” is needed. 
 
It can be seen that the degree of effectiveness contrasts with their structure of 
rights, whose degree of effectiveness appears openly insufficient. 
 
Although different arguments have been stated (from economic to political 
constraints, from the capacity of the judiciary to that of the political system), the 
leitmotiv that perhaps summarizes all of them is that social rights "cost" and the state 
has serious problems of taxation, whence the complex problems of financial 
sustainability of rights in general, and the social rights in particular, derives. The 
question of the cost of social rights refers therefore to the issue of the structure of such 
rights as well as to the maintenance of the constitutional state. Nevertheless, as pointed 
out by accredited doctrine -but also by the very constitutional jurisprudence- the cost of 
social rights should not impact on the structure of constitutionally guaranteed rights, so 
the question of the cost of rights is a false problem since it is intrinsic to all 
constitutional rights and therefore also to the classic ones of freedom6. 
 
Moreover, in relation to the question of the legal effectiveness of the so-called 
programmatic constitutional provisions it seems particularly appropriate to mention the 
argumentative iter followed by the Italian Constitutional Court7  which can be an 
example for all those systems which have constitutional guarantee clauses of the rights 
6 Cfr. G. Lombardi, “Diritti di libertà e diritti sociali”, in Politica e diritto n. 1/1999. 
7 Specially, sentences 1/1956 and 4/1981. 
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or constitutional provisions on substantive equality and dignity of the person. 
 
 
II. THE WELFARE STATE AS THE BASIS OF THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC POLICY 
 
The welfare state in Spain is fully affirmed in the 1978 Constitution8, which 
proclaims it in the art. 1 by means of the formula of "social and democratic state of 
law"9. The interventionist role of public authorities that defines the welfare state is 
found firstly in the art. 9.2 of the Constitution, from which the so-called "substantial 
social principle" (taken from the Italian Constitutional Charter) according to which 'it is 
for the public authorities to promote conditions so that freedom and equality of 
individuals and groups to which they belong are real and effective; to remove the 
obstacles that prevent or hinder their fulfillment and to facilitate the participation of all 
citizens in political, economic, cultural and social life”. 
 
From the letter of the rule that defines the structure of art. 9.2 can be followed, 
synthetically, that the interventionist dimension of public authorities, strictly speaking, 
affects three planes of reference: (i) promoting that the conditions for freedom and 
equality of the individual and the group are real and effective; (ii) the elimination of 
obstacles that stand to their full enjoyment and (iii) promoting the participation of 
citizens in the various areas of public life10. 
 
The configuration of the social state consists of different regulatory layers, 
located in different parts of the Spanish Constitution to which specific functions 
correspond. It is therefore a complex structure that can be synthesized in an essential 
way through a series of elements: in primis, as a set of values  configured as authentic 
axiological foundation of the state, together with a number of purposes set in 
programmatic rules which define the main guidelines that should inform the activity of 
public authorities; another element is the block of social rights and guiding principles of 
interventionist policies, included in Title I of the Constitution, together with a set of 
instruments and public powers which, in addition to composing the organic part and the 
autonomic corpus of Title VIII of the Spanish Constitution, design the economic 
standards of Title VII; and finally, there are some mechanisms of guarantee and control 
designed to ensure both the effectiveness of the rights recognized  and the effective 
compliance of the programmatic goals. 
 
8 Among others, cfr. R.L. Blanco Valdés, Introduzione alla Costituzione spagnola del 1978, Torino, 1999 
(ult. ed. 2009); M. Aragón Reyes, Constitución y democracia, Madrid, 1989 and G. De Vergottini, Una 
Costituzione democratica per la Spagna, Milano, 1978. 
9 M.A. Aparicio Pérez, “El Estado social en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional”, in G. Cámara 
Villar and J. Cano Bueso (ed. and coord.), Estudios sobre el Estado social (El Estado social y la 
Comunidad Autónoma de Andalucía), Madrid, 1993. 
10 F. Balaguer Callejón, “El Estado social y democrático de Derecho. Significado, alcance y vinculación 
de la cláusula del Estado social”, inn J.L. Monereo (coord.), Comentario a la Constitución socio-
económica de España, Granada, 2002. 
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From this perspective, social rights are a key element of the constitutional 
architecture of the welfare state11, in that, since all rights are linked to the previous 
value of human dignity, there are some social rights that are projected as real life 
support; thus, only from these rights condition of citizenship can be fully exercised. 
Hence, certain rights such as, education, health and housing, must be assumed as 
essential elements for access to full status as citizens, so that the different degree of 
"subjective" enforceability of certain social rights should not involve a their subordinate 
position, regardless of the economic situation, whether favorable or unfavorable. 
 
From the constitutional point of view, in other words, the normative dimension 
of social rights can be perceived, although their level of guarantee and protection may 
have a different degree of coverage, depending on their different location in the 
constitutional text12. 
 
From this perspective, assuming that the constitutional text itself includes most 
of social rights under Title I, formally calling them as "rights" both in Chapter II - in 
Sections 1 and 2 - and in Chapter III -although titled as "guiding principles of social and 
economic policy", also incorporating certain rights expressly named as such- it can be 
concluded that from the time the Constituent Assembly positivizes the rights, they are 
considered as genuine rights,  whose guarantee level generally depends on the 
provisions of art. 53 SC, which implies that their legal nature cannot be denied13. 
 
In short, the fundamental option chosen by the Spanish Constituent Assembly 
when defining the State ex art. 1.1 SC, is to include the formal and material social 
clause in combination with the democratic principle and the rule of law. 
 
This formulation, overcoming the liberal model, assumes a finalist social 
function, designed to ensure and safeguard decent living conditions and, therefore, to 
have the means to meet the needs of disadvantaged subjects. In other words, it reveals a 
conception of State which leads teleologically the direction through principles of 
political nature14. 
 
The Spanish Constitution contains provisions legitimizing and guiding the action 
of the State, so that, in addition to other economic provisions, it determines explicitly 
rules setting welfare rights as such, others that are projected as directives or mandates to 
the legislature and others taking the form of statements: in short, a series of rules which, 
taken together, are fully connected to the principle of substantive equality and therefore 
to the real and effective equality. 
 
11 J.L. Cascajo Castro, M. Terol Becerra, A. Domínguez Vila, V. Navarro Marchante (coords.), Derechos 
sociales y principios rectores, Actas del IX Congreso de la Asociación de Constitucionalistas de España, 
Valencia, 2012. 
12 J.L. Cascajo, La tutela constitucional de los derechos sociales, Madrid, 1988. 
13 G. Pisarello, Los derechos sociales y sus garantías. Elementos para una reconstrucción, Madrid, 2007. 
14 L. Ferrajoli, “Derechos y garantías. La ley del más débil”, Madrid, 2004. 
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In the very Preamble –in which the objectives aimed at ensuring harmonious 
coexistence with a fair economic and social order, the progress of culture and the 
economy, ensuring everybody a dignified life– there are several provisions defining the 
social state. Indeed this is also evident in the principle of equality, or rather in its 
indivisible and material aspects (arts. 14 and 9.2), in the welfare dimension of the rights 
and, in particular, in the recognition of social rights (for example, the right to education, 
art 27;. the right to protection of health, art. 43); and also in the benefits of the social 
security system of art. 41, in addition to the consecration of principles on the action of 
public authorities in economic and social affairs ex arts. 40, 49, 50, 51, and other 
provisions. 
 
That being so, it should be noted, however, that the core of the contents related 
to social state are largely in Chapter III of Title I, signed with the phrase "Of the guiding 
principles of social and economic policy". 
 
The analysis of this regulatory body of the Constitution is problematic because it 
clearly expresses the social dimension of the state. In other words, the problem of 
redirecting the content of these norms to legal structures in order to ensure guarantee 
levels similar to those already configured on the principles and contents of the rule of 
law and democratic state arises. Moreover, it should be noted that in fact the exercise 
and guarantee of all constitutional rights depend on public intervention, in the sense that 
it applies not only to social or welfare rights, but to a greater or lesser extent, to all civil 
rights recognized in the constitutions. These, indeed, do not escape the need for positive 
action by the State, measurable in economic or budget terms, by which to ensure their 
effective protection, so that ultimately we can say that the rights depend on taxes and 
therefore their protection always involves a cost for public authorities, also with respect 
to those rights that enjoy a legal cover at the highest level15, by virtue of the 
introduction of the so-called principle of budgetary stability -a consequence of austerity 
policies applied in times of economic and financial crisis- in the framework of the 
supreme constitutional principles that inspire and bind the state action. 
 
Accordingly, at the constitutional level it is not possible to appreciate 
immediately a relatively crystallized model of social state, in the sense that the latter 
rather than expressing a structural reality of the constitutional order, is projected as a 
teleological imperative and as such, it is expressive of the tension between social, 
political and economic forces, and this entails different possibilities of development, but 
at the same time, many contradictions. Indeed, the guiding principles, although they are 
firmly grounded from the point of view of value system and enjoy a significant 
symbolic power of evocation in relation to the articulation of new bases of the political 
and social organization, however they do not have the normative density of other 
constitutional provisions, while their nature is that of guiding principles or directive 
norms, despite that sometimes they are called rights, whose direct and immediate 
addressee is not the citizen but the public authorities. 
 
15 S. Holmes and C.R. Sunstein, Il costo dei diritti. Perché la libertà dipende dalle tasse, Bologna, 2000. 
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III. SOCIAL RIGHTS AS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 
In the framework of the second postwar constitutionalism, to state that rights 
such as education, equality, health and housing are essential to the democratic and 
contemporary concept of human dignity16 is an assertion that can be shared peacefully; 
an assertion supported by the Spanish Constitutional Court, which in its case law 
indicates that in the Spanish Constitution "human dignity is the foundation of political 
order and social peace”. Its legal form is raised to milestone of the constitutional order, 
needed to build the political order and the social peace. The constitutional concept of 
human dignity expresses the legal recognition of equality and freedom of all human 
beings by virtue of being, embodied in those values of the legal order sanctioned in art. 
1.1 of the Constitution and which are included in the fundamental rights of Title I. In 
addition, human dignity -and related rights of art. 10.1 SC- is also identified in the field 
of health, which as underlined by the Constitutional Court (CC), represents "a value of 
undoubted constitutional significance"17 of "singular importance"18 as recently 
confirmed by the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court, whereby the legal 
obligation would come from the fundamental right to dignified existence, deductible 
from the human dignity of art. 1 and the principle of the social state ex art. 20.1 of the 
German Constitution (judgment of the German Constitutional Court of February 9, 
2012). 
 
As known, therefore these are not "classic rights of freedom," whose negative 
dimension is manifested in creating a protective barrier against possible illegal 
interference of the State but rights whose nature is to provide social benefits, that is, 
rights which obligate the State to guarantee a certain service or a particular good for 
citizens19. 
 
However, at the constitutional level, as already noticed, all rights are not covered 
by the same legal status, so the problem arises of which are the consequence of this 
differentiation. In this regard, we should remember that the CC has stated that "the 
protection of family, health maintenance and adequate and dignified housing, values 
which together with sufficient social benefits in situations of necessity that must be 
guaranteed a public social security, are constitutionally enshrined in the arts. 39, 41, 43 
and 47 of the Constitution, and force public authorities, not only to the deployment of 
the corresponding administrative action."20 In other words, it can be drawn that for their 
protection, although these are legal rights, it is not decisive that they may be enforceable 
before the ordinary judge in the more or less extensive forms established by the 
legislature, as this argument would lead to give the law the role of to recognize a right 
which instead preexists it, since it has been foreshadowed in the Constitution 
establishing its existence, letting the law to determine its extent. 
16 STC 86/1985, FJ 8. 
17 ATC 96/2011 
18 ATC 239/2012 
19 Abramovich and Courtis, Los derechos sociales como derechos exigibles (Prologue by L. Ferrajoli), 
Madrid, 2002. 
20 STC 113/1989. 
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Moreover, it should be clear that, regardless of their form, the recognition of 
these rights in the SC shows the concern of the Constituent Assembly to put the person 
and their rights in the center of the legal and political construction of the State. 
Therefore a State that cannot be passive, but on the contrary, considers as a foundation 
of political order the personal dignity, so that it cannot be indifferent to the social, 
economic and cultural conditions in which the lives of the citizens operate. In short, a 
constituted State which is obliged to "promote the conditions so that the freedom and 
equality of individuals and groups are real and effective." In this regard, the Constituent 
Assembly has designed two guidelines because, on the one hand, has imposed on public 
authorities a specific role which has, given its binding nature, an effectivity of all 
mandatory and enforceable rights and, on the other, it has foreshadowed the purposes to 
which public authorities should aim, which retain respect to the latter a wider leeway, 
and therefore adscribing to the category of the guiding principles. 
 
From this point of view, the normative density concerning the compulsory 
promotion of the liberty and the equality is variable, depending on whether it is a 
fundamental right rather than a guiding principle. But if we look at the rights mentioned 
at the beginning, it is evident that the first two, i.e., education and equality, are 
fundamental rights included in Chapter II of Title I SC, while the other two, health and 
housing, fall within the scope of the guiding principles of Chapter III of the same title, 
so that the differential legal status for rights and principles refers to the problem of their 
direct legal effectiveness and, ultimately, to the issue of their virtuality for citizens21. 
 
It should be remembered that the Constitution is also a legal document22, 
consisting of several parts, which are binding both for public authorities and for 
citizens. On this basis, therefore, it is possible to note that the guiding principles of 
social and economic policy materialize their effectiveness in the democratic state, from 
their very legal nature, ie from their role of informing principles of the action of the 
public authorities, whose effectiveness can be controlled both legally and politically. 
 
In addition, leaving aside the legal force of the guiding principles which we will 
discuss below, it should reflect on the direct impact of fundamental rights in the social 
state23. 
 
From this point of view, we can say generally, that fundamental rights and 
therefore also those with social content, are effective with respect to all public 
authorities; therefore their normative virtuality depends on the will of the Constituent 
Assembly, in the sense that ensuring their protection and effectiveness does not require 
the action of the Legislature, while those with social content (such as the right to 
21 L. Prieto Sanchís, “Derechos sociales y el principio de igualdad sustancial”, in Revista del Centro de 
Estudios Constitucionales n. 22/1995. 
22 E. García de Enterría, La Constitución como norma y el Tribunal constitucional, Madrid, 1985, (III 
ed.). 
23 J.J. Solozábal, “Una revisión de la teoría de los derechos fundamentales”, in Revista Vasca de 
Administración Pública n. 58/2000. 
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education or the right to health, which have a different legal status) require the 
interpositio legislatoris and the administrative facere in order to develop their content. 
 
From this perspective, the original question about welfare social rights as 
fundamental rights embodied in the various constitutions arises, together with the 
classic fundamental rights, so, due to their different foundations, fundamental social 
rights are connected with the realization of the principle of real and effective equality, 
while the classic fundamental rights are linked to the achievement of the principle of 
freedom. This doctrinal debate, today, refers to the issue of justiciability of social rights 
and that of the constitutional protection of their essential content which, from the 
Spanish perspective, is linked to the legal status of fundamental rights as justiciable 
rights not only against the administration, but also against the legislature, so that their 
protection includes also the guarantee of a minimum content restricted, plus an equal 
recognition. 
 
From the subjective perspective, fundamental social rights are protected by the 
ordinary courts, through a preferential and summary process and, where appropriate, by 
the Constitutional Court. In summary, therefore, we can say that they are subjective 
rights endowed with a particular resistance against the legislature, as the binding nature 
of fundamental rights makes them spaces of freedom and welfare resistant to any 
possible type of impairment. Hence the legal nature of fundamental rights is extensible 
to fundamental social rights, so the welfare content of these rights become mandatory 
and therefore are enforceable, regardless of social, economic and political 
circumstances. 
 
Regarding social rights within the scope of the principles, their content assumes 
the function of informing the positive legislation and judicial practice, and so they can 
qualify as rights strictu sensu, they require legislative implementation and therefore are 
enforceable before the judicial authority. In conclusion, taking into account the different 
legal status, it can be stated that through the fundamental rights the Constituent 
Assembly configures a part of the social state and through the principles prefigures it, 
forwarding to the legislature its final configuration. 
 
 
IV. THE CONTENT AND THE LEGAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RIGHTS INCLUDED 
IN CHAPTER III OF TITLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION 
 
As already stated, it is necessary to underline that the norms contained in 
Chapter III of Title I of the Constitution are quite heterogeneous since it is possible to 
distinguish norms that identify rights expressly called as such24, in addition to duties25. 
Other provisions are mandated to the legislature, both in terms of punitive provisions of 
24 As, for example, the right to the protection of health ex art. 43.1, or the right to culture in art. 44.1, or 
the right to decent housing in art. 47, and also the right to enjoy an adequate environment in art. 45.1. 
25 As, for example, the duty of parents to attend their children (art. 39) or the duty to protect the health 
(art. 43.2) and the duty to protect the enviroment (art. 45.1). 
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administrative and criminal relevance26, and as specific mandates27. Finally, there are 
norms that set principles designed to guide the actions of public authorities in order to 
achieving general purposes, which by stating their programmatic nature are fully 
consistent with the meaning of the heading 'guiding principles' and which however can 
be differentiate by their vagueness and incompleteness regarding means, conditions and 
requirements, as can be seen emblematically in the content of art. 40.1, which states that 
"public authorities shall promote favorable conditions for social and economic progress 
and for a more equitable distribution of regional and personal income within the 
framework of a policy of economic stability." 
 
However, in order to systematize their content, guiding principles can be 
grouped taking into account the objectives pursued and which are subject to protection. 
 
Firstly, we can distinguish guiding norms establishing objectives or general 
purpose of state action; for example, it is significant the formulation linking the public 
authorities to the promotion of "the favorable conditions for social and economic 
progress and for a more equitable distribution of the regional and personal income 
within the framework of a policy of economic stability" with the intention of achieving 
full employment oriented politics in art. 40.1, which, as noted by the constitutional 
jurisprudence, in the collective dimension is combined with the right to work ex art. 
35.1 SC28. Another example of guiding norm of general purpose is in art. 44.2 SC, 
according to which "the public authorities shall promote science and scientific and 
technical research in the general interest", developed by the legislature by Law 13/1986 
of Promotion and General Coordination of Scientific and Technical Research. 
 
Along with this type of regulations, there are guiding norms on the protection of 
certain goods of general interest, among which the content of art. 45.2 SC, which states 
that "the public authorities shall ensure the rational use of all natural resources, in order 
to protect and improve the quality of life and to preserve and restore the environment, 
relying on the indispensable collective solidarity". With this norm the Constituent 
Assembly states a mandate to the public authorities intended to protect the environment, 
combining harmonically the rational economic use of natural resources with 
environmental protection. These constitutional purposes aimed at protecting the 
environment, on the one hand refer to the necessary systematic interpretation in relation 
to other principles and rights such as the right to property, free enterprise and the 
principle of the free movement of goods and29, and on the other hand, being a matter of 
transversal nature, the environment can determine the exercise of other material powers, 
as the management of the territory, fishing, etc.30. 
26 As in relation to environment (art. 45.3) or in relation to the protection of the cultural, artistic and 
historical heritage (art. 46). 
27 As, for example, in relation to foreign trade (art. 51.3) and the professional associations (art. 52), or 
also as previsions of institutional guarantee, in relation to the establishment of a public regime of Social 
Security (art. 41) or in relation to the family (art. 39). 
28 STC 22/1981, FJ 8. 
29 SSTC 227/1988, FJ 7, and 243/1993, FJ 5. 
30 STC 36/1994, FJ 3. 
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The norm in art. 46 SC can be included in this type of guiding norms. According 
to it "public authorities shall guarantee the preservation and shall promote the 
enrichment of the historical, cultural and artistic heritage of the peoples of Spain and of 
the goods comprised in it, whatever their legal status and their ownership" from where 
the possibility of introducing limits and authorizations for the sale and transfer of goods 
of "cultural interest" is inferred31. 
 
In addition, Chapter III includes norms aimed at the protection of persons, by 
ensuring a vital existential minimum, especially with regard to the protection of 
workers; indeed based on art. 41 SC "public authorities shall maintain a public Social 
Security system for all citizens guaranteeing adequate social assistance and benefits in 
situations of need, especially in case of unemployment". It is therefore clear that this 
provision expresses a central profile of the welfare state, as it prefigures the existence of 
a system of public social protection as a necessary institutional guarantee32, by which 
the mentioned constitutional principles designed to protect citizens in case of necessity 
and unemployment are concretized. 
 
In short, as noted by the Constitutional Court, Social Security should be seen as 
a "necessary function of the social and democratic rule of law"33 in the sense that 
situations of need are assigned to the minimum care constitutionally guaranteed, to 
which other contributory benefits can be attached: it is therefore unavailable for the 
legislature, because, although these rights have a legal configuration and therefore are 
susceptible to be modulated by this34, the legislature is obliged to maintain a public 
Social Security system in recognoscible terms for the image the social conscience in 
every time and place has of it. 
 
In addition, obviously, it assumes particular importance the provision contained 
in Chapter III, by which the right to health protection is recognized in the art. 43.1 SC, 
with respect to which the jurisprudence itself uses an integrating interpretation, given 
their intrinsic nature of essential human need35. Under this norm, paragraph 2 states that 
"it is the responsibility of the public authorities to organize and safeguard public health 
through preventive measures and the necessary benefits and services. The law shall 
establish the rights and duties of all in this respect”36, hence, as stated in the 
31  STC 17/1991. 
32 STC 37/1994, FJ 3d. 
33 STC 65/1987, FJ 17. 
34 STC 37/1994, FJ 3. 
35 About the right to health cfr. J.J. Ruiz Ruiz, “El derecho a la salud en la actual crisis económica: los 
límites constitucionales a los recortes de prestaciones sanitarias y las exigencias de sostenibilidad del 
gasto social”, in S. Gambino (coord.), Diritti sociali e crisi economica. Problemi e prospettive, Torino, 
2015.  
36 About the universalization of the health benefits, cfr. specially the art. 3.2 of Ley General de Sanidad 
de 1986 and, more recently, after the economic recession and the y, más recientemente, tras la recesión 
económica y the emergence of the fiscal and budgetary crisis, the abundant emergency legislation and, in 
particular, the Real Decreto-Ley 16/2012. 
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constitutional jurisprudence, it follows the necessary existence of a national health 
regulatory system (National Heal System) 37. 
 
Other norms contained in Chapter III are intended for the protection of persons 
as belonging to certain social groups, such as children (art. 39.4) or youth (art. 48), 
elderly (art. 50) or disabled persons (art. 49). Finally, there are norms connected with 
the requirement of protection of human dignity, aimed at people who demand tangible 
and intangible goods necessary for the free development of the individual, such as the 
aforementioned right to health and access to culture (art 44.1), or the right to decent and 
adequate housing (Article 47) others aimed at the specific protection of the rights of 
workers (Article 40.2); and finally other norms aimed at the social, economic and legal 
protection of the family (art. 39.1), understood, as noted by the Constitutional Court, in 
a broad sense, so that the protection is not limited to that which is born from the 
marriage of art. 3238. 
 
That having been said, we must now examine both the value and the legal 
effectiveness of the rights and principles that guide the action of the public authorities in 
Chapter III. 
 
First of all, it should be noted that, in the case of constitutional norms, there is no 
doubt that, under art. 9.1 SC, they have legal force, regardless of the specific scope of 
the constitutional regulatory structure. It seems clear that, in the case of guiding norms 
aimed to pursue the objectives of the political organization established in the 
Constitution, they comprise regulated values and criteria and, therefore, represent data 
of the system intended to their achievement and interpretation. It follows that the so-
called "guiding principles"39 cannot be understood as mere programmatic proclamations 
or be treated as if they were pure "constitutional rhetoric." 
 
Such a position has been held from the point of view of constitutional 
interpreter, for which "from that perspective, it should be recalled that the guiding 
principles of social and economic policy, among which is the aforementioned provision, 
are not mere norms without content (STC 19/1982, FJ 6) but, as far as the courts are 
concerned, their decisions must be informed by their recognition, respect and protection, 
as provided for in art. 53.3 SC40. 
 
Beyond the obvious connections with the social, democratic and lawful character 
of the Spanish State, the legal effectiveness of these principles can be found, in primis, 
in the content of art. 53.3 SC, which states that "recognition, respect and protection of 
the principles recognized in the Third Chapter shall guide legislation, judicial practice 
and actions of public authorities. They may only be invoked before the ordinary courts 
in accordance with the provisions of the laws that implement them” from which a 
mandate to the legislature which does not deprive of normative effectiveness the content 
37 STC 211/2014 FJ 4. 
38 SSTC 222/1992, FFJJ 4 y 5, 47/1993, FJ 2, 116/1999, FJ 13. 
39 J. Tajadura Tejada (dir.), Los principios rectores de la política social y económica, Madrid, 2004. 
40 STC 95/2000. 
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of the right in question, since it imposes to legislate favorably to the guaranteed content, 
which can ultimately lead to an appeal of unconstitutionality ex art. 161.1 SC, although 
considering social rights as norms does not amount to assert their justiciability. 
 
At the constitutional level, it can be firstly seen see that the norms expressly 
qualified as rights per se do not constitute subjective rights directly justiciable, but only 
legal situations enforceable before the courts, based on the scope of the laws that 
develop them in the legal level, anchoring them in the aforementioned constitutional 
foundation. In short, their effectiveness is not immediate or direct, but deferred and 
mediate as set out by the legislature, respecting the design prefigured by the Constituent 
Assembly, so it follows that they do not have the normative structure of the rights, but 
they are guiding principles susceptible of development by the legislature, configured so 
as rights that potentially have a plural configuration41. From this point of view, although 
it is not possible to recognize a full legal and constitutional protection, as in the case of 
the right to health covered by the guiding principles of Chapter III, it can be said that it 
is not possible to deny forcibly their nature and this implies, on the one hand, that a 
certain degree of enforceability can be protected jurisdictionally and, secondly, that the 
nature of constitutionally recognized right implies the existence of a content and that 
determining such content corresponds to the legislature. 
 
Regarding the effectiveness of such rights regarding the legislature this can be 
seen as a consequence of the mandate that requires their development, recognition, 
respect and protection, that the legislature is primarily called to give concreteness to 
such guiding principles and therefore also the other powers are obliged to respect the 
law under the provision of the democratic principle and the system of sources. This 
dimension is particularly reinforced at the constitutional level as it is accompanied by a 
specific institutional guarantee, as for example, in the articles 39 (protection of the 
family) and 41 (public social security system), which foreshadows a unavailable core 
for the legislature itself. However, regardless of such a significant and important 
feature, not being provided regarding the legislature the limit of respect for the essential 
content, it seems clear that the margin of discretion with respect to its configuration, is 
quite broad according the general concepts and terms used by the Constituent 
Assembly. 
 
As for the extent of the possible configuration, important issues arise: firstly, the 
issue concerning the possible remedy in case of abstention or inactivity of the 
legislature and, secondly, the question concerning the so-called principle of 
irreversibility, i.e., the possibility of understanding the contents of the guiding principles 
previously recognized assuming them as irreversible level of guarantee and, therefore, 
as binding the legislature. 
 
In accordance to the first point, ie the complex problem of "unconstitutionality 
by omission", it is sufficient to note that the Constitutional Court has not got 
41 STC 206/1997. 
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instruments to force the legislature to act in the case of an "absolute omission”, that is, if 
there is not supplement or development legislation. 
 
However, in the exercise of judicial review of legislative acts, in line of principle 
it might be accepted the possibility of control by the Constitutional Court as a result of 
an " relative omission" in the event that the relevant legislative regulation is incomplete. 
However, given that the legislature is not subject to respect the "essential content", as 
noted by constitutional jurisprudence42, this hypothesis refers to the problem of 
identifying what may be the control parameter regarding the alleged incompleteness, in 
addition to the intrinsic "vagueness and uncertainty" that define the guiding principles 
themselves. All this, however, does not close the possibility that such control can be 
exercised in the event that the principle of equality or the right to effective judicial 
protection come into play or even that can be exercised under other objective guarantees 
offered by the constitutional order, but in that case, these latter rights and guarantees in 
the context of a systematic interpretation would be those which would be placed as a 
parameter of judicial review, and the reference would not be only to the guiding 
principles.  
 
As for the so-called theory of the "irreversibility" of the content of social rights, 
which involves crystallizing the content of the rights already recognized by the 
legislative regulation, it has been adopted as a constitutional guarantee43, it could 
contravene the democratic and the political pluralism principles, since it would limit the 
free exercise of discretionary policy options in economic and social realms. However, 
the respect for the principles that define the social state admit the need to guarantee the 
essential minimum content established through legislative development. In this sense, 
the Constitutional Court, invoking the right to equality -in line with the prohibition of 
discrimination based on sex- has stated that "given the social and democratic character 
of the rule of law that our Constitution stands and the obligation imposed to the State by 
the arts. 9.2 and 35 of the Constitution to promote that the conditions for equality of 
individuals and groups are real and effective and the promotion through the work, but in 
no case can there be discrimination on grounds of sex, it can be understood that the 
worker cannot be deprived of the already achieved social conquests without enough 
reason to do so”44. Furthermore, the application of the principle of irreversibility -or of 
no regression social benefits- can be seen as a control of reasonability of a reform in 
peius of social benefits contrary to the principle of proportionality and equity or no 
unenforceable due to supervening circumstances45. From another point of view, another 
limit and interpretive instrument can be inferred from the constitutional dictate of art. 
31.2, according to which "the public expenditure shall make an equitable allocation of 
public resources, and its programming and execution shall comply with the criteria of 
42 About the nature of such principles, cfr. STC 45/1989, FJ 4, where it is stated that «it is unlikely that 
any legal norm can be considered unconstitutional by omission, that is, for not fulfilling, isolately 
considered, the mandate of the public authorities and, specially, that of the legislature, where each one of 
these principles is generally concreted». 
43 SSTC 134/1987, FJ 5, and 184/1990, FJ 5. 
44 STC 81/1982, FJ 3. 
45 SSTC 136/2012, FJ 5, 71/2014, FJ 7b and 85/2014, FJ 3c. 
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efficiency and economy" which seems to impose in a finalist way the sense of the 
redistributive effect of public expenditure. 
 
Finally, regarding the legal effectiveness, since the Spanish Constitution 
generally refers to the recognition, respect and protection of the guiding principles that 
should inform the action of public authorities, it appears that government and 
administration are bound by those norms, both in the exercise of the management 
function and in the exercise of normative authority itself. The same is true with respect 
to judicial organs, as also constitutionally judicial practice must be informed by these 
principles, so that both the interpretation of the norms and their application, cannot be 
outside the guiding principles. Regarding the latter, a fortiori, suffice it to recall that this 
constitutional requirement is also reinforced by art. 5.1 of the Organic Law of the 
Judiciary, which states that judges and courts interpret and apply the laws and 
regulations "according to the precepts and constitutional principles", according to their 
interpretation by the Constitutional Courts, so that from this view, there arises the 
possibility that the courts use these principles as a constitutional parameter to raise any 
questions of unconstitutionality. 
 
 
V. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS  
 
  In the Spanish constitutional order most of welfare social rights are presented as 
formal rights and materially conditioned by the concrete development made by public 
authorities and therefore their immediate enforceability before the ordinary judge is 
limited by the constitutional provision of art. 53.3. 
 
Such an arrangement, according to the jurisprudence of the constitutional court 
implies, on one side, a derogation of the obligatoriness of the Constitution, since it 
affirms that "the constitutional principles and fundamental rights and freedoms are 
binding on all public authorities (arts. 9.1 and 53.1 SC) and are immediate source of 
rights and obligations and not mere programmatic principles. The very fact that our 
basic norm in art. 53.2 provides a special system of protection before the Constitutional 
Court, which extends to conscientious objection, is but a confirmation of the principle 
of immediate applicability. The only exceptions of this general principle are the cases 
where so impose the Constitution itself (i.e. the guiding principles of Chapter III) or 
when the very nature of the norm prevents considering it immediately applicable46. 
 
It follows that the Constitutional Court may control a violation of the 
Constitution by omission of legislatively developing a constitutional norm, thus 
ensuring the protection of those subjective legal situations, at least in terms of their 
essential minimum. 
 
Although welfare rights can be invoked before the ordinary courts in accordance 
with the terms laid down in the laws that develop them, it seems possible to find a 
46 STC 15/1982. 
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constitutionally consistent interpretation by the ordinary judge, which could pose a 
appeal of unconstitutionality on the limits of the law of development approved by the 
public authorities, based on a parameter that systematically combines several 
constitutional provisions (Preamble, art. 1.1 of the Preliminary Title, Guiding Principles 
of Chap. III Tit. I, art. 9.2 and art. 14 EC). 
 
Such systematic and evolutionary interpretation, as already noted, already used 
by other European constitutional courts, could rely on the arguments by the supreme 
interpreter when, in discussing the nature of the guiding principles of social and 
economic policy, states that "it is unlikely that any law can be considered 
unconstitutional by omission, that is, for not respecting, in isolation, the mandate of the 
public authorities and, in particular, the legislature, in which each of these principles is 
usually concreted"47. 
 
However, from this interpretive perspective, according to an attentive doctrine, 
"not prevent, obviously, the possibilities of control that might result from the coming 
into play the principle of equality, the right to effective judicial protection or any 
objective guarantee provided by the constitutional order, but in these cases these rights 
or guarantees would be the constitutional control parameter within a systematic 
interpretation and not, by themselves, the guiding principles"48. In that sense, for 
example, the right to vital minimum49 could be configured from the right to life (art. 
15), from the principle of the social State (art. 1.1.) 50, in relation to the dignity of the 
person (art. 10.1) and also from some guiding principle such as the right to the 
protection of health (art. 43), to adequate housing (art. 47). 
 
Even more, referring to social rights the Spanish constitutional jurisprudence, as 
the Italian, does not accept the thesis of the programmatic nature of constitutional 
norms, stressing that "the Constitution is just that, our supreme law and not a 
programmatic or main statement; this is something affirmed unequivocally and 
generally in the art. 9.1 which states that "citizens and public authorities are subject to 
the Constitution" as well as that "repeated decisions of this Court as supreme interpreter 
of the Constitution (art. 1 LOTC) have declared that indubitable value of the 
Constitution as a norm"51. Regardless the immediate obligatoriness of some 
constitutional provisions, included in Chapter II, "Rights and Freedom" (articles 14-38), 
which do not need mediation of the ordinary legislature and are directly effective 
without legislative development, paraphrasing the Constitutional Court: "if it is true that 
such value needs to be modulated with regard to the arts. 39-52 in the terms of art. 53.3 
of the Spanish Constitution, there can be no doubt about the immediate binding nature 
47 STC 45/1989. 
48 Cfr. F. Balaguer Callejón, (coord.), Manual de Derecho constitucional, 2008, (III ed.). 
49 Cfr. P. Tenorio, “El Tribunal Constitucional, la cláusula del Estado social, los derechos sociales y el 
derecho a un mínimo vital digno”, in AAVV (Actas IX Congreso de la ACE), Derechos sociales y 
principios rectores, Valencia, 2012. 
50 In relation to the legal fundamental values and principles in which the Spanish democratic and social 
rule of law is founded, in particular: SSTC nn. 4/1981, 15/1982, 16/1982, 77/1982, 80/1982, 7/1983, 
8/1983, 15/1983. 
51 STC n. 80/1982. 
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(i.e., without mediation by the ordinary legislature) of the arts. 14-38, components of 
the second chapter of the first title, as the first paragraph of art. 53 states that the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this chapter are binding on all public authorities. That the 
exercise of such rights has to be regulated only by law and the need for it to respect their 
essential content, mean that these rights already exist, and are binding on all public 
authorities including obviously the judges and magistrates members of the judiciary 
(art. 117 EC), from the very moment of the entry into force of the Constitution. One of 
such rights is equality before the law of all Spaniards, there may be no discrimination 
between them on grounds of birth (art. 14 EC)"52. 
 
Furthermore, as a part of the doctrine supports, other constitutional provisions, 
those concerning the "guiding principles of social and economic policy" (arts. 39-52) 
need a legislative modulation in accordance with the provisions of art. 53.3 SC in 
response to their "different legal effectiveness"53. 
 
However, in consideration of their nature of general constitutional provisions, 
such rights and principles as a whole are directive to the action of the legislature as well 
as hermeneutical criterion and parameter for the judges in the exercise of the judicial 
function. It is, in short, a set of fundamental principles and values that the Constituent 
Assembly of 1978 believed suitable to recognize constitutionally while assuring the 
courts and judges a deep elasticity, which was necessary in view of the concrete 
conformation in Spain to the deep historical, economic and social changes already 
experienced over decades in other European countries. 
 
However, from the beginning of the new millennium54 the complex architecture 
of contemporary constitutionalism, to which largely the achievements in terms of 
civilization and social justice are due, seems today to crack because of many forces and 
trends of varied nature that make waver forms and ways of being of the democratic, 
social, legal and constitutional state, and that until yesterday were assumed to be firm 
and definitive as inherent to the idea of democracy conceived as heritage of everyone55. 
 
In this context, it is evidently that the most acute problems of the crisis concern 
especially to the welfare state model. 
 
In Spain the development and crisis of the welfare state model have elements of 
continuity with other European systems, and especially, the countries of the 
52 Ibidem. 
53 Among others, cfr. E. García de Enterría, La Constitución como norma y el Tribunal constitucional, 
Madrid, 1985, (III ed.) y Jiménez Campo, “Estado social y democrático de derecho”, in Diccionario del 
sistema político español, Madrid, 1984. 
54 Cfr. M. Luciani, “Integrazione europea, sovranità statale e sovranità popolare. Norme e idee”, inn 
Istituto Enciclopedia  Italiana,  XXI secolo. Norme e idee, Roma, 2009, Vol. I.  
55 Cfr. M. Luciani, “Integrazione europea, sovranità statale e sovranità popolare. Norme e idee”, in 
Istituto Enciclopedia  Italiana,  XXI secolo. Norme e idee, Roma, 2009, Vol. I., ove secondo l’Autore 
“l’idea che la crisi della sovranità sia un problema solo per gli stati non è accettabile … essa è un 
problema innanzitutto per le persone perché senza sovranità i loro diritti politici (e non solo) non sono 
garantiti e le politiche redistributive non si possono attuare”, p. 164. 
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Mediterranean area, exacerbated by the economic and financial crisis and the relative 
political and constitutional answers both on the national and on that European realm56. 
On the basis of the crisis in the social, democratic and legal constitutionalism, a central 
relief is occupied by the consequences of the economic crisis linked to the limits on 
public expenditure and, therefore, to the availability of public resources needed for 
ensuring the exercise of the functions of the welfare state57, on the loss of centrality of 
parliamentary decision respect to the demands, now constitutionalized, of levelling the 
balance of the state and, ultimately, on the effectiveness of human rights58. 
 
In such a scenario, the welfare state, born to guarantee freedoms and rights in the 
constitutional perspective of realizing the goals of social justice, due to degradation / 
evanescence of social rights eventually makes fragile the democracy itself, ignoring the 
normative value the constitutional text. 
 
But do not forget that, although in different ways, the European constitutions of 
the last post-war, beyond procedural rules, are substantive rules regarding the very 
content of the laws. In other words, it is in the normative conception of the Constitution, 
as norm and limit of the legislative acts, where its superiority is located59. Show, by 
assigning direct binding nature to the fundamental principles and norms, it is the most 
innovative and original aspect of the contemporary constitutionalism and, at the same 
time, reflects the historical requirement of not leaving the system of freedoms and rights 
to the mere realization of principle of legality but of making it an instrument of 
guarantee and direction in addition of protection and promotion. 
 
Finally, the problem of the welfare state (in Spain and other European countries) 
basically concerns not only the general taxation, but also the very representative quality 
of the democracy and, therefore, in order to the adequacy of the protection of the 
represented interests represented, in short, it depends on the effectiveness of the 
democratic principle. 
 
The reduction of available resources also endangers the very justiciability of 
fundamental rights, not only the social ones. Such a risk, however, seems even more 
56 Cfr. F. Puzzo, “Il costituzionalismo dei diritti sociali e la sovranità finanziaria statale, ovvero dalla 
novella costituzionale sul c.d. ‘Federalismo fiscale’ al Trattato europeo sul c.d. ‘Fiscal Compact’, 
passando per la Legge cost. n. 1/2012 sul principio del pareggio di bilancio”, in S. Gambino (coord.), 
Diritti sociali e crisi economica. Problemi e prospettive, Torino, 2015.   
57 Cfr. S. Gambino (coord.), Diritti sociali e crisi economica. Problemi e prospettive, Torino, 2015, and in 
particular S. Gambino, “Crisi economica e diritti sociali (con particolare riguardo al diritto alla salute, 
all’assistenza sociale e all’istruzione)”, G. Ruiz-Rico Ruiz, “El valor de los derechos constitucionales en 
tiempos de crisis”, J. Lozano Miralles, “Universidad y crisis económica: el caso español”.     
58 Cfr. M. Luciani, “L’equilibrio di bilancio e i principi fondamentali: la prospettiva del controllo di 
costituzionalità”, in www.cortecostituzionale.it, 22/XI/2013, A. Spadaro, “I diritti sociali di fronte alla 
crisi (necessità di un nuovo «modello sociale europeo»: più sobrio, solidale e sostenibile” en Rivista AIC 
n. 4/2011 (www.rivistaaic.it); C. Salazar, “Crisi economica e diritti fondamentali”, in Rivista AIC n. 
4/2013; A. Ruggeri, “Crisi economica e crisi della Costituzione”, in AA.VV., Scritti in onore di Antonio 
D’Atena, Milano, 2015. 
59 Cfr. E. García de Enterría, La Constitución como norma y el Tribunal constitucional, Madrid, 1985, (III 
ed.) and V. Crisafulli, “La Costituzione e le sue disposizioni di principio”, Milano, 1952.  
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pervasive because of the provisions introduced in the new art. 135 of the Spanish 
Constitution (and similarly on the reform of article 81 of the Italian Constitution) which 
makes the enforceability of fundamental rights in monetarily conditioned rights, which 
leads to discharge on judges of final recourse -Constitutional Court, Court of Justice of 
the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights- the decision on the 
balance between financial sustainability and effectiveness of social law. 
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